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Pursuant to congressional mandate, the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission (NBRC) reported its recommendations for
modification of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended
(the "Bankruptcy Code"),' to the President, Congress, and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on October 20, 1997. This Article, the
second and final installment analyzing the tax recommendations of
the NBRC, focuses on the proposed revisions relating to, among
other things, taxation of corporate and partnership debtor estates.
In particular, this Article discusses the requirement of reasonable
notice to the government, bankruptcy court jurisdiction over tax
controversies, bankruptcy administration affecting tax matters,
chapter 11 plan requirements, and substantive tax matters.
Under the auspices of the NBRC, the Tax Advisory Committee
(the "Advisory Committee") was formed in February 1997. The
members of the Advisory Committee were appointed by the NBRC
and include representatives from the private bar, federal and state
governments, and academia.2
The NBRC directed the Advisory Committee to report back
with a Final Report by the August 1997 meting in Washington, D.C.
The NBRC further requested that the Advisory Committee prepare
Preliminary Reports for the April 1997 meeting in Seattle, Wash-
ington, and the June 1997 meeting of the NBRC in Detroit, Michi-
gan. The Preliminary Reports identified those areas of bankruptcy
taxation that the Advisory Committee had determined to be suscep-
tible to agreement among its members, and those proposals that
had been withdrawn from consideration by the Advisory Committee
as unimportant, unclear, or considered elsewhere. The Advisory
Committee continued the process of discussing and identifying
those proposals that might be susceptible to agreement. The Final
II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
The Advisory Committee members were Paul Asofsky, Mark Browning, Steve Csontos,
Robert MacKenzie, Robert Miller, Grant NewtonJoan Pilver, Mark Seigel, and Ken Weil. My
compiments to the fellow members of the Advisory Committee They all performed passion-
ately and, as a body, accomplished much. The author chaired the Advisory Committee. The
NBRC's charge to the Advisory Committee was broad, including the jurisdiction to propose
and discuss all issues related to federal, state, and local tax collection, compliance, and re-
porting related to bankruptcy, the bankruptcy process, and the administration of the bank-
ruptcy estate. By necessity, this charge included an analysis of existing authority under both
the Bankruptcy Code, title 11 of the United States Code, and the Internal Revenue Code, title
26 of the United States Code.
1998]
264 BANKRUPTCYDEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL [Vol. 14
Report contains three sections! The first section contains a listing
and discussion of twenty-eight consensus items.4 The first twenty-
five of the twenty-eight items were presented to the NBRC at the
May 1997 meeting and twenty-four of the items were adopted
unanimously.5 The second section contains a listing and discussion
of six consensus items.6 The federal participants on the Advisory
Committee abstained from consideration of these proposals. The
third section contains a listing and discussion of twenty-nine pro-
posals concerning those areas of bankruptcy taxation that the Advi-
sory Committee has determined are Very Important and Highly
Controversial to Controversial.7 Although short of a consensus on
these contested issues, the Advisory Committee has provided the
NBRC with its recommendations and voting record on the twenty-
nine proposals.!
s See TAX A)VISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT at 5-6 (August 1997) (hereinafter "TAG
Report").
See id. at 5.
The items adopted by the NBRC at the May 1997 meeting were: Track Nos. 105, 106,
109, 214 Part H, 216, 217(a), 311, 313, 315, 325, 326, 332, 334, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 702,
435(a), 437,505, 701, and 711. Track No. 101 was considered by the NBRC but not adopted.
The Advisory Committee has supplemented the initial list to include additional consensus
items, including Track Nos. 441, 513(a), and 700. Id. at 6.
" See id.
See id Rather than initiating a new numbering system to track bankruptcy tax pro-
posals, the Advisory Committee continued the numbering and tracking system of the previ-
ous tax matrices as a matter of convenience and in an effort to reduce confusion over discus-
sions concerning bankruptcy tax proposals. Those proposals added to the matrix by the
Advisory Committee were assigned 700-series index numbers. Furthermore, where appropri-
ate, the Advisory Committee split multiple proposals into component parts, thus, the original
proposal No. 414 has been redesignated Nos. 414,414(a), and 414(b). See id., at 4.
' Before the Advisory Committee was formed, much work on the interface between
bankruptcy and tax had been accomplished. The Department of Treasury, through the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department ofJustice, prepared working papers on
relevant topics and proposals, and participated informally in discussions. The National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General also submitted a number of tax proposals for consideration.
The NBRC held at least two working meetings in San Diego, California, and Santa Fe, New
Mexico, where many bankruptcy taxation issues were discussed and developed. NBRC mem-
ber James I. Shepard has also undertaken an extensive study of the tax issues posed in the
bankruptcy process. Furthermore, the Government Working Group has discussed several tax
issues. The Special Task Force on the National Bankruptcy Review NBRC of the Section of
Taxation of the American Bar Association has prepared an extensive report on bankruptcy
tax issues. The National Bankruptcy Conference has already prepared a report on bank-
ruptcy tax issues. Judges, trustees, and other concerned parties have submitted proposals for
consideration by the Advisory Committee and the NBRC. The combined efforts of the par-
ties described above have led to the development of a Tax Matrix in excess of 90 pages with
well over 100 proposals. While many of the proposals adopted by the NBRC were recom-
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I. REASONABLE NOTICE TO TAXING AuTHoRITIES
One of the most difficult issues in the area of bankruptcy tax
involves the issue of what constitutes reasonable notice to govern-
mental authorities. To be sure, the issue of adequate notice to the
government transcends tax disputes, particularly with greater local
and state involvment in bankruptcy cases. The Advisory Committee
sought to clarify the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code addressing
reasonable notice to governmental units.
The Advisory Committee agreed that notice provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code must be clarified as those provisions relate to gov-
ernmental units. There was a consensus that the government
should not lose its rights against the debtor or the bankruptcy estate
in a bankruptcy case because of a debtor's failure to provide notice
reasonably calculated to reach the proper representatives of the
government. Although the details as to what constitutes reasonable
notice are not self-evident, the Advisory Committee reviewed the
Tax Related Information Items contained in the Justice Depart-
ment's letter of March 7, 1997, to the Advisory Committee on Bank-
ruptcy Rules.9 The Advisory Committee found the items contained
in the letter penned by the Justice Department reasonable. Ulti-
mately, the NBRC unanimously adopted the notice proposal urged
by the Advisory Committee.
The Advisory Committee suggested that the NBRC consider
three parts to any proposal on notice to the government. First, no-
tice to the government must be reasonably calculated to reach the
proper representatives of the government and must reasonably
identify the debtor. Without a reasonably targeted notice require-
ment under the Bankruptcy Code or Rules, one can continue to ex-
pect the government to experience special difficulties because of
the large and diffuse nature of governmental units and the difficulty
governments may have in identifying claims and interests in the
bankruptcy case. Improved notice would enhance the fairness and
efficiency of the bankruptcy process. Improved notice should also
reduce inadvertent violations of the automatic stay and reduce costs
associated with the bankruptcy case.
mendations by the Advisory Committee, on occasion the NBRC rejected the recommenda-
tion of the Advisory Committee and adopted one of the competing proposals.
' Letter from the Justice Department to the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
(Appendix IV) (March 7, 1997) (on file with author).
19981 265
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Second, to facilitate proper notice, the NBRC should recom-
mend to Congress some mechanism to provide sufficient informa-
tion to permit a debtor to properly identify the relevant federal,
state, or local governmental authority for purposes of providing rea-
sonable notice under the circumstances. For example, a debtor's
attorney who practices in Nevada may be aware of the governmental
department to which one must provide notice regarding state sales
tax in Nevada, but may be unaware of the department with sales tax
responsibility in Georgia, a state where the client has done business.
However, there was a strong belief among the majority of the Advi-
sory Committee members that a national central registry for all gov-
ernment units is impractical. When one considers the vast array of
local ,governmental units, one quickly envisions reams of phone
book-like volumes of listings that may quickly become outdated.
Presently, there is no logical entity to support such a system. The
consensus of the Advisory Committee is that the bankruptcy clerk's
offices compile and maintain the registry (that would presumably be
available nationally on PACER). A district or local approach, as op-
posed to a national registry, should lead to more manageable lists.
The clerk's offices are capable of organizing a notice list into ap-
propriate subdivisions (federal agencies, state agencies, local gov-
ernmental agencies) in an effort to make the district registries user-
friendly. The creation and maintenance of a local registry provide a
necessary resource to aid in giving adequate notice. If a govern-
mental unit is not listed in the registry, the debtor would be ex-
pected to provide reasonable notice and would be protected if the
debtor made a good faith effort to provide reasonable notice.
Third, failure to provide reasonable notice should result in
some sanction, including exception to any bar date and the non-
dischargeability of tax claims where the debtor has not provided
reasonable notice in a manner consistent with the applicable Bank-
ruptcy Code section or Rule. A notice requirement is too central to
the design of the Bankruptcy Code to be aspirational. Thus, some
type of sanctioning tool is necessary to the overall utility of a notice
provision.
Finally, the Advisory Committee recommended that all notice
issues affecting governmental units should be taken up as one over-
all proposal with amendments coming in the form of changes to the
[Vol. 14
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Bankruptcy Rules." A piecemeal approach to notice serves the best
interests of no one. Unforunately, it appears that the Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules does not have the same sense of urgency that
those who practice in the area have.
One area of controversy that was not resolved by the notice
proposal involved the potential derivative tax liability of debtors.
For example, an individual debtor may have held high-level posi-
tions with several companies, some or all of which may not have
paid over trust fund taxes like payroll to the government." To what
extent must the debtor disclose potential trust fund liabilities in her
own bankruptcy case? 2 Obviously, if any of the trust fund liabilities
have been assessed against the debtor, anyone that asserts these li-
abilities should be listed in the schedules filed with the bankruptcy
court. The controversy begins, however, with potential trust fund
liabilities. Just how much investigation must a debtor and her at-
torney undertake before they discharge any duty to reasonably re-
port derivative tax liabilities? A conservative approach runs the risk
of incurring the wrath of sanctions, including nondischargeability of
otherwise dischargeable tax debts. A liberal approach amounts to a
"come and get me" cry to the government. A better approach, an
approach that accommodates both debtors and the government, is a
reporting requirement that asks the debtor to list key positions with
businesses within a certain period before her personal bankruptcy
filing.
The Advisory Committee also recommended and the NBRC
adopted a proposal to amend 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) to require debtor
taxpayers and trustees seeking an expedited audit to comply with
local notice and specificity requirements to assist governmental
units in making a timely response. Section 505(b) permits a trustee
to request a prompt audit from a taxing authority. If the taxing
authority fails to respond within sixty days to the request, the trustee
is discharged from liability for any taxes beyond the taxes shown on
the return. 4 Presently, the IRS has directed that § 505(b) requests
'" Although it may be more appropriate for the Rules Committee to address the notice
issues, the Advisory Committee emphasized that reasonable notice is a key consideration
running throughout the proposals in this Final Report.
" See C. RICHARD MCQUEEN &JACK F. WiLLAMs, TAX AsPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRA(C'TIC:E §§ 10:18-10:19 (Sed. 1997).
IRC § 6672.
" See I IU.S.C. § 505(b) (1994).
S ee id.
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be filed with the local District Director.'5 Nonetheless, some courts
have held that a trustee may ignore the IRS directive and file a
§ 505(b) request with the IRS Service Center.'6 It was the consensus
of the Advisory Committee that governmental units are entitled to
timely and reasonable notice in the bankruptcy process. However,
adequate and timely notice often depends on obtaining informa-
tion in order to identify the appropriate governmental representa-
tive. Consequently, it was the consensus of the Advisory Committee
that the NBRC propose the creation and maintenance of a local or
district registry maintained by the bankruptcy court clerks that
would provide sufficient information so that a debtor may comply
with more stringent notice requirements.'
7
II. BANKRUPTCYCOURTJURISDIGTION OVER TAX CoNTRovERsIEs
One of the most controversial issues addressed by the Advisory
Committee was the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to decide
tax controversies." This is one of those delightful areas that serves
as a window to a deeper understanding of the debate among many
interests. Much of the debate on bankruptcy reform turns on the
trust that constituencies have in the bankruptcy courts' ability to ef-
fectuate the intent of Congress. This particular area of the law is no
different.
A. Introduction to Bankruptcy CourtJurisdiction Over Tax
Matters
The broad grant of jurisdiction allowing the bankruptcy court
to determine tax liability is actually codified in two places in the
Bankruptcy Code. First, and sometimes overlooked, are Bankruptcy
Code §§ 501 and 502, which permit the bankruptcy court to esti-
mate and determine the allowability of claims, including tax claims,
against the estate.'9 Second, Bankruptcy Code § 505(a) (1) provides:
See Rev. Proc. 81-17, 1981-1 C.B. 688.
See In re Canfe Corp., 128 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989).
', See Comments to Proposal #106.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Kearns (In re Kearns), 1998 WL 153996 (8th Cir. 1998); Carlson v.
U.S. (In re Carlson), 126 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 1997); Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidat-
ing Trust, 123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997). See generallyMCQUEEN & WIULAMS, supra note 11,
ch.3.
. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 501-502 (1994)
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Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court may
determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relat-
ing to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously as-
sessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested before and
adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent ju-
risdiction.20
The bankruptcy court is authorized under Bankruptcy Code
§ 505(a) (1) to rule on the merits of any tax claim involving any un-
paid tax, fine, or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, of
the debtor or the bankruptcy estate. In general, this authority ap-
plies whether the tax penalty, fine, or addition to tax has been pre-
viously assessed. This section provides taxpayers in bankruptcy with
an alternative prepayment forum to the tax court and is an excep-
tion to the Flora' rule requiring full payment of the tax prior to
non-tax court litigation. The language of § 505(a) (1) is very
broad.'
A bankruptcy court's ability and authority to determine the tax
liability of a debtor and a bankruptcy estate often may turn on the
procedural stage at which the determination is sought and the tax is
owed. The first stage involves taxes that arose before the petition in
bankruptcy -as filed. The second stage involves taxes that arose
postpetition but before the case was closed or a plan of reorganiza-
tion was confirmed. The third stage involves taxes that arise after a
plan of reorganization is confirmed.
Id. § 505(a).
, Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) (full payment of tax is prerequisite to fil-
ing suit in federal district court).
" See In re Eua Power Corp., 184 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (holding that the
bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to consider and determine the question of a chapter 11
debtor's right to a property tax refund where the debtor did not request an abatement or
refund with the applicable taxing agency within the time required by state law); In re
D'Alessio, 181 B.R. 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the factors which must be con-
sidered in determining whether to abstain from resolving a debtor's tax liability include the
complexity of the tax issues involved, the need to administer the case in an orderly and effi-
cient manner, the burden of the bankruptcy court's docket, the time required for trial and
decision, the asset and liability structure of the debtor, and the prejudice to the debtor rela-
tive to the prejudice to the taxing authority from inconsistent judgments); In re Starnes, 159
B.R 748 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear
a chapter 7 debtor's postdischarge adversary proceeding to determine the debtor's federal
income tax liability, where no evidence was presented to the court which indicated that any
prior adjudication of the merits of the tax claim had occurred in a contested proceeding be-
fore a court of competentjurisdiction).
1998]
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Generally, a bankruptcy court may assert jurisdiction to deter-
mine tax matters involving prepetition and postpetition-
preconfirmation tax claims subject to abstention by the bankruptcy
court where appropriate. As to postconfirmation tax matters, the
authorities are in disagreement, with the IRS asserting that a bank-
ruptcy court lacks authority to declare the federal tax consequences
of a plan of reorganization. Each procedural stage will be analyzed
in turn to provide a better understanding of the proposals consid-
ered by the NBRC.
1. Determination of Prepetition Taxes
Both 11 U.S.C. §§ 505(a) (1) and 502 permit a bankruptcy court
to determine the merits of any prepetition tax claim involving an
unpaid tax, fine, or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax,
of the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.s" Generally, this authority is
present regardless of whether the tax, penalty, fine, or addition to
tax has been previously assessed. However, there are limits to the
broad grant of power under 11 U.S.C. § 505 (a). These limits may
be found in § 505(a) (2) and in relevant case law.2
Cases have strongly endorsed the view that § 505 (a) provides a
broad grant ofjurisdiction to determine prepetition taxes. For ex-
ample, in In re Barry,' the bankruptcy court held that it had juris-
diction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 505(a) (1) to determine a debtor's
various objections to tax claims, and that such objections were a
core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (B).25 Moreover,
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502,505(a) (1) (1994).
See id. § 505(a) (2). See, e.g., St.John's Nursing Home v. City of New Bedford (In re
St.John's Nursing Home), 169 B.R. 796 (D. Mass. 1994); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., 1996 WL
354696 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
48 B.RI 600 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
" See In re Palm Beach Resort Prop., Inc., 51 B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (holding
that the bankruptcy court had the jurisdiction to determine a tax which was not seasonably
"contested"); see also; In re Fyfe, 186 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that absten-
tion of the bankruptcy court from determining the debtor's tax liability and the validity of a
tax lien on the debtor's property was warranted until the debtor showed that he had ex-
hausted all administrative and legal remedies to resolve the disputed tax claims that were
available to him without first having to pay the claim); In re 150 North Street Assoc. Ltd.
Partnership, 184 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (holding that a chapter 11 debtor's liability for
real estate taxes was not "adjudicated" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code provision limit-
ing a bankruptcy court's power to determine a tax liability if the amount was contested or
"adjudicated" by ajudicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction prepetition,
even though the debtor had sought and obtained an abatement from the city, where the
270 [Vol. 14
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in Smith v. U.S.,7 the bankruptcy court held that use of the term
"may" in the Bankruptcy Code provision, which grants a bankruptcy
court the authority to determine the validity and amount of a tax, is
the grant of power to determine tax liability rather than merely a
permissive option. In addition, the bankruptcy court may not ab-
stain from exercising jurisdiction over a motion requesting the de-
termination of tax liability unless the interest of creditors and debt-
ors would be served by an abstention. Furthermore, in In re AH
Robins Co.,2" the bankruptcy court held that a debtor's failure to
challenge certain West Virginia tax assessments did not deprive the
bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to decide the validity of such tax
claims even though the West Virginia tax statute provided that as-
sessment became final and conclusive and was not subject to admin-
istrative or judicial review unless the taxpayer petitioned for reas-
sessment within sixty days. In Kilen v. U.S.,2 the bankruptcy court
held that the IRS had a "claim" recognizable in bankruptcy against
the debtor with potential trust fund tax liability as the "responsible
person" of numerous taxpayer corporations with the result that such
"claim" provided an actual controversy for adjudication by the
bankruptcy court. Finally, in In re K-Fabricators, Inc.,"s the bank-
ruptcy court held that it had the power to determine the amount
and legality of any tax on a debtor which had not previously been
contested.
debtor was not given a hearing and was unable to appeal the decision because of outstanding
tax arrearages); In re St. John's Nursing Home, Inc., 169 B.R. 795 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding
that the filing of a tax abatement application by the chapter 11 trustee was a prerequisite to
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction concerning the estate's request for a refund of Massachu-
setts real property taxes).
In reSmith, 122 B.R. 130 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
126 B.R. 227 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
In reKilen, 129 B.R 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
135 B.it 654 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992). See also Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. City of
Bainstable (In re Cumberland Farms, Inc.), 175 B.RL 138 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (holding
that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality and the amount of a
chapter 11 debtor's unpaid taxes, even though the debtor had not contested the taxes under
state procedure and even though the time for doing so had expired); Holly's, Inc. v. City of
Kentwood (In re Holly's, Inc.), 172 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that the
bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to render a final judgment on the debtor's
preconfirmation real property tax liability, but that the doctrine of resjudicata barred the
debtor's request to determine its preconfirmation tax liability); In re Camp, 170 B.RI 610
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that the federal government's tax claim was contingent
and disputed, as listed on the debtors' bankruptcy schedules, absent any indication in the
schedules that the debtors had scheduled the government's claim in bad faith).
1998]
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2. Determination of the Tax Liability of the Estate for the
Period of Administration
Section 505 (b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
A trustee may request a determination of any unpaid liability of the
estate for any tax incurred during the administration of the case by
submitting a tax return for such tax and a request for such a determi-
nation to the governmental unit charged with responsibility for col-
lection or determination of such tax. Unless such return is fraudu-
lent, or contains a material misrepresentation, the trustee, the
debtor, and any successor to the debtor are discharged from any li-
ability for such tax-
(1) upon payment of the tax shown on such return, if-
(A) such governmental unit does not notify the trustee within 60
days after such request, that such return has been selected for ex-
amination; or (B) such governmental unit does not complete such
an examination and notify the trustee of any tax due, within 180
days after such request or within such additional time as the court,
for cause, permits:
(2) upon payment of the tax determined by the court, after notice
and a hearing, after completion by such governmental unit of such
examination; or
(3) upon payment of the tax determined by such governmental
unit to be due.3
Section 505(b) allows the trustee (including a debtor-in-
possession when no trustee is appointed) discretion in all cases to
ask the local, state, or federal taxing authority for a prompt audit of
the trustee's returns on behalf of the estate, although such audits
are allowed only on the basis of tax returns filed by the trustee for
completed taxable periods.' Thus, before a bankruptcy case is
closed or at any time during the administration of the case, the trus-
tee may request the taxing authority to audit all returns filed by the
trustee and to determine liability for any tax incurred during the
bankrupty case. The procedure for filing a request for prompt de-
termination is set forth in Rev. Proc. 81-17." To make such a re-
11 U.S.C. § 505(b) (1994).
See id.
Rev. Proc. 81-17, 1981-1 C.B. 688.
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quest, the trustee must provide the Special Procedures function with
a written application, a complete copy of the return(s), and a state-
ment of where the original return was filed.' To summarize, a trus-
tee must take the following steps to comply with Rev. Proc. 81-17:
1. The trustee must file a request for prompt determination in
,accordance with Rev. Proc. 81-17;
2. The IRS must notify the trustee within 60 days after receipt
of the request as to whether it accepts the return as filed or
desires to examine the return;
3. If an examination is conducted, the IRS is required to no-
tify the trustee of any tax deficiency within 180 days of the
request, subject to extensions of time approved by the
bankruptcy court;
4. If the trustee disagrees with the results of the examination,
the trustee may ask the bankruptcy court to resolve the dis-
pute;
5. If the IRS either fails to notify the trustee within sixty days
of the request for determination of tax that the return has
been selected for examination, or fails to complete the ex-
amination and notify the trustee of any tax due within 180
days (plus any extension of time granted by the bankruptcy
court), the trustee, the debtor, and any successor to the
debtor are discharged from any further liability for such
taxes, unless the return filed is fraudulent or contains a ma-
terial misrepresentation.'
In U.S. v. McElmorem the district court held that the personal
liability of the trustee and the debtors was terminated where the
trustee requested the determination of the tax liability when he
filed late returns and the IRS failed to notify him within sixty days
that the return had been selected for examination. However, in In
re Rode, the bankruptcy court held that the bankruptcy estate is not
the "successor to the debtor" within the meaning of the provision of
the Bankruptcy Code stating that the debtor, trustee, and any
"successor to the debtor" are discharged from liability resulting
from tax if the taxing authority fails to act within the time limits of
See id.
See id.
In re Estes, 87 B.R. 52 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
2731998]
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statute. 17 Additionally, in In re Fondiller,ss the district court held
that the statute discharging the trustee, the debtor, and the debtor's
successors from liability for tax, if the government does not respond
within sixty days after a request for determination of tax, did not
discharge the debtor's estate from liability for tax on the theory that
the estate was the debtor's successor."
Section 505(b) is intended to provide prompt audit proce-
dures. It is a reasoned procedure for both the trustee and the
debtor to obtain discharge from further tax liability for those taxes
incurred during the period of estate administration. Of course,
should the trustee fail to request a prompt audit, and assets are re-
turned to the debtor, the debtor is not discharged from possible
transferee liability for taxes relating to such assets.0
3. Determination of Post Confirmation Tax Liability
This stage presents some of the most important and problem-
atic jurisdictional issues in all of bankruptcy. Here is a violent clash
between bankruptcy and tax policies. In order for bankruptcy
courts to determine tax ramifications related to plan confirmation
under § 505(a) (1), they need to first find that § 505(a) (1) applies to
more than just preconfirmation tax claims. Although there is noth-
ing in the legislative history to § 505(a) (1) which indicates it was in-
tended to apply to tax issues other than preconfirmation tax claims,
the legislative history does not explicitly limit § 505(a) (1)'s applica-
tion to only those types of tax issues.
The current ability of bankruptcy courts to make determina-
tions regarding the income tax consequences of chapter 11 reor-
ganization plans is best addressed by dividing income tax issues into
" 119 B.R. 697,698 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
125 B.R. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
" See also Kellogg v. U.S., (In re West Tex. Mktg Corp.), 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a bankruptcy estate is not a "successor to the debtor" entitled to a discharge of
the tax obligation under Bankruptcy Code § 505(b), and thus that the IRS did not violate the
tax liability discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Code when it assessed an estimated tax
penalty against the bankruptcy estate more than sixty days after the chapter 7 debtor's request
for determination).
' See, e.g., In reVale, 180 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that a chapter 7
trustee's motion to determine tax liability of the bankruptcy estate could not be withdrawn
except by order of the bankruptcy court, and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deemed proper, because the IRS filed an objection to such motion which was the equivalent
of an answer to the motion).
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two categories: (1) those related to state and local taxes on the one
hand and (2) those related to federal taxes on the other. This clas-
sification highlights the fact that these two categories have different
statutory bases regarding the ability of bankruptcy courts to make
determinations of the income tax consequences of reorganization
plans.
There is a general agreement among authorities that a bank-
ruptcy court has the power to determine state and local tax conse-
quences of a confirmed plan of reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.4' There exists no such consensus regarding a
bankruptcy court's ability to declare the federal tax consequences of
a confirmed plan of reorganization. Generally, declaratory judg-
ments on federal tax issues are prohibited by the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act.42 Nevertheless, an express exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act permits declaratory judgments in the case of "a pro-
ceeding under § 505 or § 1146 of Title 11." Hence, it would appear
that a bankruptcy court may enter a final judgment declaring the
federal tax consequences if an actual controversy over federal taxes
is otherwise within its jurisdiction.
The ability of bankruptcy courts to render declaratory relief re-
garding the federal tax consequences of chapter 11 plans presents a
much more difficult question than state or local tax determinations
because there is no explicit statutory authority allowing such relief.
All references to federal taxes in the draft of § 1146 were deleted by
a last-minute amendment prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code. Congress took this action to prevent the Bankruptcy Code
from becoming stalled in Congress and because it intended to pass
a comprehensive bill the following year to address the federal tax
ramifications of bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, Congress amended the Declaratory Judgment Act.
It now provides:
[I]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with re-
spect to Federal taxes other than... a proceeding under section 505
or 1146 of title 11 ... any court of the United States, upon the filing
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1146(d) (1994); GORDON D. HENDERSON & STEWARTJ. GOLDRING,
FAIIING AND FAILED BUSINESSES 1II 1012.03, at 168(a) n.150(b). See also Stayner v. Village of
Sugargrove (In re Stayner), 185 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the bankruptcy
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve a postconfirmation tax liability allegedly
owed to the State of Illinois).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
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of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal re-
lationships of any interested party seeking such declaration.43
As one will see, this provision in the Declaratory Judgment Act
provides some mischief. Although a court may not use § 1146(d) to
address federal tax issues, it may use Bankruptcy Code § 505 and the
exception of § 505 from the provision generally prohibiting the use
of declaratory judgments in tax matters.
Currently, determinations are made by bankruptcy courts con-
cerning the federal income tax consequences of chapter 11 plans of
reorganization outside of § 505(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code and
the Declaratory Judgment Act. As an obvious example, bankruptcy
courts are required to determine whether a plan of reorganization
is feasible under § 1129(a) (11) of the Bankruptcy Code." That sec-
tion states:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following require-
ments are met: Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed
by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.45
The bankruptcy court has a mandatory duty to determine
whether a reorganization plan satisfies the confirmation require-
ments in § 1129(a), and the plan proponents have the burden of
proving that all those requirements have been met. Consequently,
the impact of the federal income tax consequences of the proposed
reorganization plan is one of the "related matters" that the bank-
ruptcy court must consider in making a finding that confirmation of
the plan will not likely be followed by the need for further financial
reorganization. In a chapter 11 case, the federal income tax issues
and liabilities surrounding the reorganization plan should be con-
tained in the debtor's disclosure statement in order to provide the
creditors and interest holders with adequate information to allow
them to make an informed decision when voting on the plan.
Moreover, the tax implications of the reorganization plan and the
reorganized company should be reflected in the debtor's financial
VI Id.
" IU.S.C.§1129(a)(11) (1994).
43Id.
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projections as part of its disclosure statement because taxes play a
significant role in determining the profitability of a business and,
consequently, the feasibility of the business's reorganization plan.
All of these materials, some of which project future events and are
based in part on contingencies which may or may not occur, are re-
viewed by the bankruptcy court in determining plan feasibility. Ac-
cordingly, the bankruptcy court must inherently make a determina-
tion under § 1129(a)(11) that any adverse tax consequences
resulting from confirmation of the plan or events beyond confirma-
tion are not so great as to jeopardize the success of the postconfir-
mation company.46
Thus, in Unsecured Creditors Committee of Goldblatt Brothers
v. U.S., 47 a bankruptcy court upheld its authority to issue a declara-
tory judgment regarding whether an account established pursuant
to the terms of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization would be re-
quired to pay federal, state, and local income taxes and file returns.
The bankruptcy court, among other things, rested its conclusion on
the precise language in the Declaratory Judgment Act exception.'
In determining whether it had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory
judgment in the matter, the bankruptcy court stated that:
[I]n the absence of any provision expressly excluding federal and
state income taxation from the adjudicative power of bankruptcy
courts, determination of whether a bankruptcy court can adjudicate
tax issues would be evaluated under § 157 standards like any otherju-
risdiction issue. If the tax dispute involved a core controversy, then a
bankruptcy court could enter final enforceable orders. If the tax dis-
pute was only "related to" the case under title 11 the bankruptcy
court could submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
If neither of those tests were satisfied, then the bankruptcy court
would not have jurisdiction to hear the case at all.'9
" See Donald D. Haber, Federal Tax Issues in Bankruptcy Reorganizations: What Role
Should Bankruptcy Courts Have in Declaring the Federal Income Tax Liability of Debtors
and the Federal Income Tax Consequences of Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization, 3 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 407 (1995). The author strongly recommends this article as one of the
most lucid treatments of the issues.
'7 In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 106 B.R. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
See id.
Id. at 525.
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The court found the tax dispute at issue to be a core proceed-
ing under § 157 because the account was created as part of the
debtor's confirmed plan of reorganization. The court commented
that under its holding:
[T]he parameters of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of federal and state taxation under [Bankruptcy Code § ]
505(a) (1) corresponds with general principles governing a bank-
ruptcy court's power to adjudicate at least core matters under 28
U.S.C. § 157!0
Consequently, the court upheld its authority to issue a declara-
tory judgment regarding the matter. Thus, it would appear that
Goldblatt suggests that a bankruptcy court, pursuant to its declara-
tory judgment power, may declare the federal income tax conse-
quences of a confirmed chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
In In re McLean Industries, Inc.,5' a bankruptcy court con-
cluded that it did not have the authority to declare the federal tax
consequences of a confirmed chapter 11 plan of reorganization un-
der the Bankruptcy Code because of the procedural stage at which
the request was made. The court stated:
This court will not render an advisory opinion as to the possible
danger to the debtors' NOLs because such a threat remains purely
hypothetical at this juncture. A court can only determine an issue
that presents a "real, substantial controversy between parties having
adverse legal interest, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypotheti-
cal or abstract." Until the regulations are officially promulgated,
there could not be concrete controversy concerning the debtors' tax
situation.
In the future, if the proposed regulations are ultimately adopted,
then the appropriate issue would be whether a retroactive application
of the IRC would divest the debtors of their NOLs. Additional issues
Id at 529.
Unpublished opinion (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoted in Henderson & Goldring, su-
pra note 41, at11012.0S).
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would involve jurisdictional conflicts between the tax authorities and
the bankruptcy courts.52
There are several persuasive reasons to conclude that bank-
ruptcy courts have the authority consistent with the Declaratory
Judgment Act and 11 U.S.C. §§ 505 and 1129 to declare the federal
tax consequences of a confirmed chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
First, section 1146(d) specifically permits a bankruptcy court to is-
sue declaratory judgments concerning plan feasibility with respect
to state and local taxes." Under § 1146(d), a bankruptcy court is
authorized to permit the proponent of a plan of reorganization to
request from the appropriate state and local tax authorities a de-
termination of the tax effect of a plan of reorganization.' This re-
quest to state and local authorities is limited to questions of law and
not fact.' On an adverse determination by a state or local taxing
authority, or on the completion of 270 days, a bankruptcy court may
declare the effect of a confirmed chapter 11 plan of reorganization
on state and local taxes.' Thus, the power of the bankruptcy court
to determine the tax affects of the plan is limited to issues of law
and not to questions of fact, such as the allowance of specific deduc-
tions. The bankruptcy court could declare whether the reorganiza-
tion qualified for tax free status under state or local tax rules, but it
could not declare the dollar amount of any tax attributes that sur-
vive the reorganization. 7
Second, exceptions to the Declaratory Judgment Act strongly
suggest that a bankruptcy court has the power to determine the tax
consequences of a confirmed plan of reorganization under § 505.
Third, section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code requires, among other
things, that a plan of reorganization must be feasible before it can
be confirmed by the bankruptcy courtL Feasibility often turns on
the tax consequences of the proposed plan of reorganization.
Shackling a bankruptcy court so that it may not rule on the federal
tax consequences of a proposed plan may force a bankruptcy court
52 Id.
" 1IU.S.C.§ 1146(d) (1994).
5 See id
See id.
See id.
See 123 CONM. REc. H 11,115 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards),
123 CONG. IRE. S 17,432 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. Deconcini).
IIU.S.C.§ 1129(a)(11).
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to deny confirmation because the feasibility of the proposed plan,
which may turn on the tax status of the surviving entity or the exis-
tence and usability of valuable tax attributes such as net operating
losses (NOLs), may be too remote.0
B. Limitations on the Power of the Bankruptcy Court to
Determine Tax Matters
After providing a very broad (virtually limitless) jurisdictional
grant of § 505 (a) (1), Congress limited the exercise of such power by
adding 11 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2). Section 505(a) (2) reads:
The court may not so determine-
(A) the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition to tax
if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by
a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction be-
fore the commencement of the case under this title; or
(B) any right of the estate to a tax refund, before the earlier of-
(i) 120 days after the trustee properly requests such refund from
the governmental unit from which such refund is claimed; or
(ii) a determination by such governmental unit of such request.60
Among other things, this subsection preserves the validity of
much of the ruling in Arkansas Corporate Commission v.
Thompson.6 ' There, the United States Supreme Court held that the
bankruptcy court lacked the power to redetermine or alter a tax
claim that had been previously determined by a local, state, or fed-
eral agency, at least as long as the agency had acted in a quasi-
judicial capacity and had obeyed applicable law.62
" One avenue of obtaining a prospective ruling should not be overlooked. A chapter
11 plan proponent may seek a private letter ruling from the IRS. Private letter rulings are
issued by the IRS to specific taxpayers and are not precedent for others. The IRS has the dis-
cretion to deny requests for private letter rulings and will issue one only in the interests of
sound tax administration. Requesting a letter ruling is time consuming and may prove un-
fruitful. Thus, some chapter 11 plans have expressly conditioned their plans' confirmation or
effective date upon a favorable IRS ruling, such as in the Federated Department Stores bank-
ruptcies.
1 IU.S.C. § 505(a)(2).
" 313 U.S. 132 (1941). See also In re Baker, 172 B.R. 966 (Bankr. D. Or. 1994)
(holding that bankruptcy court lacked authority to set aside a stipulated decision of the tax
court concerning the debtors' income tax deficiencies).
See Thompson, 313 U.S. 132.
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1. Statutory Limits
As provided in Bankruptcy Code § 505(a)(2), the bankruptcy
court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits of any tax
claim previously adjudicated in a contested proceeding before a ju-
dicial or administrative tribunal of competentjurisdiction. For this
purpose, a proceeding in a tax court is considered contested if the
debtor filed a petition therein and the IRS filed an answer to the pe-
tition. Accordingly, where a petition and answer were filed in the
tax court before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and the
debtor later defaulted in the tax court, it was held that the bank-
ruptcy court could not rule on the debtor's or the estate's liability
for the same taxes."
Under § 505 (a) (2), the trustee must follow regular administra-
tive procedures in order to obtain a tax refund, unless the refund
results from an offset or counterclaim to a claim or request for
payment by the taxing authority.6 If the trustee files a regular re-
fund request, the taxing authority has 120 days in which to act. If
the 120-day period passes without action by the taxing authority, the
bankruptcy court then may rule on the merits of the refund claim.'
Under § 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, a
suit for the refund of federal taxes may not be filed until six months
following the filing of an administrative claim for refund with the
IRS.67 In bankruptcy cases, Congress shortened the period during
which the IRS must act to 120 days, recognizing the expedited
process in bankruptcy. Thus, in In re Caile Corp.," the court held
11 U.S.C. §505(a) (2).
But see In re Buchert, 69 B.R. 816 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1987) (defaultjudgment in state
court did not bar relitigating matter in bankruptcy court). See also Baker v. IRS, 74 F.3d 906
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the tax court's stipulated judgment "adjudicated" the debtors'
tax liability prepetition, precluding the bankruptcy court's determination of the amount and
the legality of any tax); In re Teal, 16 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that under principles
of resjudicata, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding the
debtor's tax liability for which a prepetition agreed order was entered in the tax court); In re
Cohen, 169 B.R. 759 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that a stipulated decision entered in
the tax court regarding a chapter 1I debtor's tax liability for a prior tax year precluded the
bankruptcy court from redetermining the amount of the debtor's tax liability).
I U.S.C. § 505(a) (2) (1994).
See id.
I.R.C. § 6532 (1994).
128 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989). See also In re Flaherty, 169 B.R 267 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994) (holding that the 60-day response period following the trustee's request for
determination of tax liability did not commence on the trustee's filing such request with the
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that a trustee had properly mailed a request for an expedited audit
procedure to the IRS Service Center for the filing of returns and
payments of taxes, and was not, therefore, required to submit an
additional request to the office of the IRS District Director where
the bankruptcy case was pending.
To summarize, under Bankruptcy Code § 505(a) (2), the trus-
tee must follow regular administrative procedures in order to obtain
a tax refund, unless the refund results from an offset or counter-
claim to a claim or request for payment by taxing authority. If the
trustee files a regular refund request, the taxing authority has 120
days in which to act. If the 120-day period passes without action by
the taxing authority, the bankruptcy court may rule on the merits of
the refund claim. Revenue Procedure 81-18 provides the procedure
to be followed by a bankruptcy trustee or other fiduciary in filing a
claim for credit or refund of any overpayment of tax.'
2. Court Limits
Several courts have held that the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion to resolve tax claims extends only to claims against the debtor
or the estate, not against its officers (or any other third party). Al-
though Bankruptcy Code § 505(a) is not by its terms so restricted,
these courts have relied principally on the legislative history.'
These courts have held that the bankruptcy court may not resolve
claims against officers of the debtor corporation for failure to pay
employment withholding taxes, even if the debtor corporation's
chapter 11 plan provides for those claims to be satisfied fully.7
In the context of a consolidated return group where the com-
mon parent is in bankruptcy, it would seem that a substantive de-
termination of the group's tax liability by the bankruptcy court
should be binding on the IRS as to all group members (regardless
of whether they are in bankruptcy), because under the consolidated
IRS Service Center, as opposed to filing such request with the District Director Special Proce-
dures Unit created to expedite bankruptcy tax returns, in view of the ambiguity of the statu-
tory language construed).
Rev. Proc. 81-18, 1981-1 C.B. 688.
,See, e.g., In re Cadillac Recreation, Inc, 159 B.R. 244 (C.D. I1. 1993) (holding that a
bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over a tax claim relating to responsible person
liability imposed on a nondebtor for failing to turn over withholding taxes that the chapter 11
debtor-employer collected).
" See id.
[Vol. 14
NBRC Tax Recommendations
return regulations the common parent generally has the exclusive
authority to represent the consolidated group in tax litigation mat-
ters. Moreover, it is possible that even where the bankruptcy court's
determination purports to be binding on the IRS as to some, but
not all, the members of the group-such as where the common
parent is not in bankruptcy, but other members are-the IRS may
nevertheless be bound by such determination as to all members of
the group. This result is premised on the principles of resjudicata
and collateral estoppel, and has been referred to by some courts as
the doctrine of "judicial estoppel."
C. Advisory Committee Proposals
Several proposals seeking to limit bankruptcy court juris-
dicition were rejected by the Advisory Committee. Each of these
proposals are addressed below.
1. Limit Scope of§ 505(a)
For example, the Advisory Committee rejected a proposal to
limit the scope of Bankruptcy Code § 505(a).7 This proposal lim-
ited the intervention of bankruptcy courts in determining a tax li-
ability to situations in which a nonbankruptcy forum would have ju-
risdiction to hear the matter. In cases like In re Piper Aircraft
Corp.,7' In re East Coast Brokers & Packers, Inc.,74 and In re Ledge-
mere Land Corp.," courts found jurisdiction to consider a debtor's
liability for taxes notwithstanding the debtor's failure to challenge
timely the assessments under applicable state law procedures. Thus,
under this proposal, if the time for appeal of an assessment to an
administrative tribunal or appeal of a tribunal's decision to a state
court would otherwise have expired or is premature because the
administrative appeal is ongoing, the bankruptcy court would simi-
larly lack the jurisdiction to hear the matter. Likewise, if under state
law, the time for the filing of a tax refund or redetermination of a
property tax assessment has expired, no such request for reconsid-
" By a vote of 7-to-I (with two abstentions), the Advisory Committee recommended that
the Commission reject the proposal.
171 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
142 B.R. 499 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
135 BJ. 193 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
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eration can be made to the bankruptcy court. However, if a debtor
could properly take an appeal from a decision in a nonbankruptcy
forum, the bankruptcy court could hear such a matter, applying the
same burdens of proof and standards of review as would be applica-
ble in the nonbankruptcy forum.
Those members of the Advisory Committee offered several
good reason for the proposed modification. These reasons in-
cluded: (1) current law rewards the negligent or miscreant taxpayer
for his previous behavior and encourages forum shopping, (2) cur-
rent law permits court interference with the appeal procedure even
if it is at a stage of development where the matter can be resolved
quickly and efficiently, (3) current law treats tax claims differently
than all other claims against the estate where concepts such as stat-
ute of limitations, laches and full faith and credit, are applicable,
(4) the argument that the right to reconsider previously determined
tax liabilities is a protection for other creditors is flawed when the
vast majority of bankruptcy filing are no-asset chapter 7 cases, (5)
current law encourages tax determinations by bankruptcy courts
with little experience of a foreign jurisdiction's tax law, making de-
cisions of significant impact on that state and locality, and conse-
quently diminishing the uniformity and consistency of those tax
laws, (6) current law places a difficult administrative burden on
states and localities, forcing them to expend considerable sums to
defend their tax determinations in a foreign jurisdiction, and (7)
many states and localities maintain records for certain definite peri-
ods of time based upon their state law that limits the period during
which appeals can be taken or requests for reconsideration of tax
determinations made. Thus, allowing the taxpayer an unlimited pe-
riod of time during which a tax determination can be brought be-
fore the bankruptcy court unfairly prejudices states and localities.
Finally, there is a serious question as to whether § 505 (a) is constitu-
tional in light of the Seminole decision.
According to those members favoring limiting jurisdiction un-
der § 505 (a), certain accommodations could be made to ensure that
decisions made in state or local forums are made promptly so as not
to interfere with the bankruptcy process. For example, if an appeal
"' See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (the court held that
Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Elev-
enth Amendment hnmunity). As this Article goes to press, the constitutionality of § 505(a) is
being litigated in In re Warren Dean, Case No. 96-20025 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.).
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were still timely at the time of the bankruptcy filing, section 108
could be amended to allow a debtor additional time to take his ap-
peal, either through the state system or in bankruptcy court.
Moreover, section 505 (a) could impose certain timetables on states
and localities to ensure that any decisions remaining to be made at
that level are made promptly and permit the bankruptcy court's as-
sertion ofjurisdiction if the time periods are not met.
The arguments against the proposal, however, were compel-
ling. Congress had addressed the issue carefully and thoughtfully
when it enacted § 505 (a). Cogent reasons existed and still exist for
the continuation of present § 505(a), including the concern that
some state law procedures do not permit ajudicial determination of
taxes. Moreover, taxes are often assessed without the thoughtful
participation of the taxpayer. The experience of the tax practitio-
ners on the Advisory Committee is that claims arising from uncon-
tested proceedings are grossly overstated. This proposal would
eliminate one of the most valuable, equitable tools of the bank-
ruptcy court to establish the correct balance due. '
2. Limits on Tax Jurisdiction Over Non debtors
A second proposal to limit the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
over tax matters was also rejected by the Advisory Committee.'
Specifically, this proposal sought to impose a limitation on the
bankruptcy court's power to determine the tax liability of a non-
debtor. Under the proposal, unless permitted by state law, or the
parties so stipulated, the bankruptcy court would be barred from
determining the tax liability of nondebtors. With respect to the is-
sue of the court's determination of the tax liabilities of nondebtors,
equity demands that anyone wishing to avail himself of the benefits
of bankruptcy protection should also be required to submit his as-
sets to the court and creditors and his financial affairs to the public
scrutiny.
However, the proposal went too far. There are times when it is
beneficial and in the best interests of the bankruptcy process to
permit the bankruptcy court to determine the tax liability of a non-
' By a vote of 6-to-4, the Advisory Committee recommended that the NBRC reject the
Proposal.
" Without § 505(a), many taxpayers who are otherwise deserving, would be denied
chapter 13 relief simply because of an overstated, incorrect tax claim.
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debtor, for example, in the consolidated return situation. Further-
more, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides ample support for jurisdictional
limitations where necessary.
3. Request for Prompt Tax Determination Under § 505(b)
A troubling issue for the trustee and unsecured creditors of the
estate is the application of the § 505(b) discharge to the estate as
well as to the debtor, successor to the debtor, and the trustee where
the taxing authority does not audit the estate's returns. 7  Section
505(b) provides that on the request for a determination of the tax
by the taxing authority, trustee, debtor, and any successor to the
debtor are discharged from any tax liability other than that re-
flected on the return unless the IRS notifies the taxpayer that the
return will be examined. If the return is selected for examination,
the taxing authority completes the examination within 180 days,
and the taxpayer pays any additional tax resulting from the exami-
nation as determined by the court or by the governmental unit, no
additional tax can be assessed. Until 1990, tax practitioners worked
under the assumption that this provision applied to the estate since
it applied to the trustee who is responsible for administering the as-
sets of the estate. However, in the early 1990s, two bankruptcy
courts held that this provision did not apply to the estate.'
The internal logic of § 505(b) suggests that the estate should be
included in the provision providing for the discharge of tax liabili-
ties where the taxing authority has failed to comply with the strict
time requirements in that section. Relying on the language of the
section, courts have consistently held otherwise."' This proposal is
consistent with congressional intent for providing for expedited
audits and speedy, final determination of tax liabilities in bank-
ruptcy. Discharging the trustee from any tax liability, but not dis-
charging the estate, provides little assistance to the trustee who is at-
tempting to administer the estate. The trustee will find it difficult to
See, e.g., Steven J. Csontos et al., Congress' Role in Bankruptcy Tax Policy. A Round-
table Discussion, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L Rev. 257 (1995); Paul B. Geilich, Essentials of Bank-
ruptcy Tax Law, 66 Am. Bankr. LU. 323 (1992).
' See In re Fondiller, 125 B.R. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1991); In re Rode, 119 B.R. 697 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1990). In 1995, the Fifth Circuit also held that this provision did not apply to the
estate. See Kellogg v. U.S. (In rewest Tex. Mktg Corp.), 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir. 1995).
" See, e.g., In reFondiller, 125 B.R. 805; In re Rode, 119 B.R. 697; In re West Tex. Mktg
Corp., 54 F.3d 1194.
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administer the estate not knowing the estate's tax liability. Pre-
sumably, the trustee would have to wait for the statute of limitation
to run before the amount of tax would be certain. Thus, until the
trustee makes the final distribution or until the statute of limitation
runs, the trustee has no assurance that an unexpected tax deficiency
would not be asserted by a governmental tax unit. The ability of the
trustee to make partial distributions may be hindered because of the
uncertainty of tax claims. Additional cost to the estate and resulting
reduction in payments to creditors would be incurred even if the
trustee prevails in a claim inserted at the end of the case.' If the
decision of the Fifth Circuite is adopted by othei courts, trustees,
even without a change in § 505(b), may elect to file returns at the
end of the case rather than as the returns are due. To limit these
provisions to the trustee and not to the estate provides limited bene-
fit to the trustee other than providing that the trustee may not be
liable for the tax if an error is made in the filing of the return.
However, it is questionable whether this limitation would apply to
the damages creditors may have sustained due to a last-minute asser-
tion of a priority tax claim (i.e., suits may be filed against the trus-
tee's bond). Generally, trustees invoke § 505(b) by filing a request
for audit simultaneously with the filing of a return. This procedure
is consistent with the letter and the spirit of 11 U.S.C. § 505(b).
Section 505 (b) is a mechanism by which a trustee may cleanse a tax
year and avoid liability for any unpaid tax in certain circumstances.
Consequently, section 505(b) discharges the trustee from any tax
liability incurred by the estate covered by the prompt audit request.
The need for this discharge is not limited to the close of the case.
The purpose of the prompt audit request-to protect trustees in
those circumstances delineated in § 505(b)-is also furthered by its
application during the case. The proposal to provide that the dis-
charge provisions apply only to the final request for tax determina-
tion (return) would encourage trustees to wait until the end of the
case to file tax returns. No party, including the taxing authorities,
benefits from this action.
A modification of this provision to provide that the discharge provisions apply only to
the final request for tax determination (return) would encourage trustees to wait until the
end of the case to file tax returns. No party, including the taxing authorities, would benefit
from this change.
See In rewest Tex. Mktg. Corp., 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir. 1995).
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The proposal, however, was not without its detractors. The
quick audit procedure of 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) was intended to pro-
vide a trustee with a means for determining the tax liability incurred
by the trustee during administration of a case to permit closing of
the case. The proposal to discharge an estate from liability when a
trustee requests an audit would change the fundamental purpose of
the § 505(b) procedure-to determine the trustee's liability for
tax. An estate should not be discharged of a tax that it is capable of
paying simply because the trustee invokes the quick audit proce-
dure. Furthermore, allowing trustees to discharge their liability one
year at a time under 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) is questionable as a matter
of policy.
According to those opposed to the proposal, discharging the
estate would constitute a windfall for the unsecured creditors. The
IRS' resources are limited and only a small percentage of tax re-
turns are audited. One can understand why participants in the
bankruptcy process would want to curtail the opportunity for audits,
but further curtailment of tax audits of the estate is contrary to
sound tax administration. Many trustees invoke 11 U.S.C. § 505(b)
by filing a request for audit simultaneously with the filing of a re-
turn. This procedure is consistent with the letter of 11 U.S.C. §
505(b), but not with its spirit since the purpose of enacting the
prompt audit procedure was to facilitate closing of the estate. Until
such time as the estate is to be closed, it should remain liable for
taxes that the trustee had failed to report correctly and should not
be allowed to avoid such liability.'M
4. DeclaratozyJudgments on Prospective Tax Issues
One of the most controversial issues concerned a bankruptcy
court's ability to grant declaratory judgments on prospective tax is-
sues in chapter 11 plans of reorganization.85 Historically, declara-
Although tie statement in favor indicates that the proposal for extending § 505(b) to
the estate is consistent with congressional intent, this does not appear to be the case. As
originally proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, the
prompt determination procedure was not intended to relieve the debtor or successor corpo-
ration, in a reorganization or rehabilitation case, of taxes incurred during administration.
See William T. Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws: Tax Procedures, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1439-40 (1975).
8 See, e.g., In reNVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Goldberg (In re Hartman Material Handling Sys., Inc.), 141 B.R. 802 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1992);
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tory judgments have not been allowed in controversies regarding
federal taxes.6 The rationale is that a declaratory judgment is sim-
ply a way to circumvent the prohibition against injunctions con-
tained in I.R.C. § 7421. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Congress
has whittled away at the declaratory judgment restrictions over the
87years.
Each of these exceptions is premised upon the overwhelming
importance to the taxpayer of receiving an advance determination
rather than being left at the mercy of an unfavorable IRS ruling.
The same justifications apply to bankruptcy reorganizations. The
debtor cannot stay in bankruptcy forever. It must confirm a plan or
liquidate. Creditors must know the tax consequences of a plan of
reorganization on which they are required to vote to make an in-
formed decision. Failure of the IRS to issue a favorable ruling may
put the plan proponents in the practical position of not being able
to consummate a plan simply because the IRS either disagrees with
the intended tax consequences or for some reason refuses to rule.
The federal government has vigorously opposed any attempt to
grant the bankruptcy court the power to declare the tax conse-
quences of a confirmed plan. The Anti-Injunction ActeM and the
Declaratory Judgment ActM generally deny a court the jurisdiction
to determine the prospective tax consequences of an event or trans-
action. Declaratory judgments are permissible only with respect to
tax-exempt status of an organization, " qualification of a pension
plan,9 and the status of tax-exempt bonds. Those members of the
Advisory Committee oppossed to expanded jurisdiction assert that
the case has not been made for a bankruptcy reorganization excep-
tion to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Corporate reorganizations,
both in and outside of bankruptcy, are currently made on the basis
Donald D. Haber, The Declaratory Powers of Bankruptcy Courts to Determine the Federal
Tax Consequences of Chapter 11 Plans, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L RhV. 407 (1995).
See28 U.S.C. §2201 (1994).
These exemptions include the following:
Exempt organizations. I.LC. § 7428;
Pension plans. I.RC. § 7476;
Tax-exempt bonds. I.RC. § 7478;
Section 367 transfer. Former I.RIC. § 7477 (repealed).
" 26 U.S.C. § 7421(1994).
o 28 U.S.C. § 2201(1994).
26 U.S.C. § 7428 (1994).
' 26 U.S.C. § 7476 (1994).
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of opinions of corporate counsel, and rulings can be requested
from the IRS. There is no greater need to drag the IRS into court
in a bankruptcy reorganization than in any other form of reorgani-
zation. The disclosure statement in a chapter 11 case should discuss
the tax consequences of the proposed plan of reorganization.
Creditors should be entitled to rely on those representation without
any need for the IRS or a court to issue a ruling in every case. The
court can consider representations concerning tax consequences
made in a disclosure statement in connection with a feasibility de-
termination. Such a determination does not bind the IRS, but is a
sufficient check on overly optimistic representations. If the IRS re-
fuses to issue a ruling, the plan proponent can still consummate a
plan in reliance on the opinion of corporate counsel.'
I. ADMINISTRATION AFFCT=G TAx MATTERS
The Advisory Committee intended that the NBRC use the op-
portunity to address several important tax problems in the admini-
stration of the bankruptcy case. Several proposals are discussed be-
low.
A. Segregated Account Requirements for Small Business Debtors
It was the consensus of the Advisory Committee that the Bank-
ruptcy Code should be amended to require that "small business
debtors" create and maintain separate bank accounts for trust fund
taxes and nontax deductions from employee paychecks. Present law
does not require the trustee or the debtor in possession to segregate
funds for the payment of trust fund taxes and nontax deductions
from employee paychecks. The result is that these taxes may go un-
paid when the reorganization fails and the case is converted to a
case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
As to the sanction imposed for failure to comply with this re-
quirement, the Advisory Committee strongly suggested that the
Bankruptcy Code differentiate between failure on the part of the
debtor and failure on the part of the trustee in maintaining segre-
Transactions that are complicated enough to raise concerns about the tax effect of a
bankruptcy reorganization are put together by sophisticated taxpayers and the tax depart-
ments of large accounting and law firms. Financial transactions involving billions of dollars
are consummated in reliance on such opinions without advance IRS rulings orjudicial decla-
rations.
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gated accounts. When a debtor fails to comply with the segregation
requirement, then the court should have the power to dismiss-the
bankruptcy case. When a trustee fails to comply with the segrega-
tion requirement, such as in a chapter 7 case or in some chapter 11
cases, then dismissal is inappropriate. Rather, more appropriate
sanctions in these circumstances include denial of fees to the trus-
tee, surcharge against the trustee's bond or personal liability for
willful failure, and removal from the trustee panel.
B. Straddle Tax Years for Corporate Debtors
Another difficult issue concerned the potential bifurcation, for
claim filing purposes, of a corporate tax year that straddles the peti-
tion date. Three proposals have been made for the treatment of the
corporate tax liability accruing in the straddle tax year (the tax year
in which the bankruptcy petition is filed). First, the decisions of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits could be codified, establishing the rule
that the tax liability is apportioned between prepetition eighth pri-
ority and postpetition first priority administrative expense." Sec-
ond, the IRS and Justice Department have proposed that the entire
straddle tax year's liability be treated as an administrative expense,
thereby overruling the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases. 95 Third, the
entire straddle tax year's liability could be treated as an administra-
tive expense, except that corporations would be granted the same
election to bifurcate the straddle tax year that is available to indi-
viduals. 9 Although each proposal is addressed in turn, the NBRC
adopted the third proposal, thus providing the greatest amount of
flexibility regarding tax matters to corporate debtors.97
' There was an emerging consensus to include all business debtors under this re-
quirement. However, a majority of the Advisory Committee concluded that expanding the
proposal to include large business debtors needed more thought.
" See Missouri Dep't of Rev. (In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co.), 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter O'Neill]; Towers v. U.S. (In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co.), 64 F.d 1292 (9th Cir.
1995) [hereinafter PATCO].
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (1), 503(b) (1994).
Compare IRC § 1398.
By a vote of 7-to-3, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Commission
adopt Proposal 2-No bifurcated tax year. The Advisory Committee recommended the rejec-
tion of Proposal 1 by a vote of 6-to-4, and split 5-to-5 on a recommendation for Proposal 3.
Six members preferred Proposal 2, three preferred Proposal 3, and one preferred Proposal 1.
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Presently, in the straddle tax year, individuals can elect a bifur-
cated tax year, but corporations cannot9 When a straddle tax year
is bifurcated, the prepetition tax liability receives an eighth prior-
ity." The postpetition liability is the individual's personal obligation
and not an administrative expense of the bankruptcy estate. The
reasoning for this bifurcated treatment is that two juridic entities ex-
ist where only one existed previously-the bankruptcy estate and
the individual. '°°
Unlike an individual, a corporation cannot exist separate from
itself. Accordingly, it was thought that a bankruptcy filing by a cor-
poration would not create a bifurcated straddle tax year. The entire
tax liability accruing in the straddle tax year would be a first priority
expense of administration. However, both the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have apportioned the straddle tax year liability.'0 ' Thus, at
least in those circuits, the liability accrued as of the petition date is
given an eighth priority, and the liability accruing after the petition
date is given a first priority expense of administration.
The IRS proposal seeks to overrule PATCO and O'Neill by
providing that only income or gross receipt taxes incurred by a cor-
porate debtor prepetition are excluded from treatment as adminis-
trative expenses. Corporations filing chapter 7 and 11 cases do not
have a separate bankruptcy estate for federal income tax purposes,1
2
thus, these corporations are not allowed the same election as indi-
vidual debtors.'0 3 Consequently, these corporations are not allowed
the same election as individual debtors to bifurcate their their
straddle tax year between a prepetition period and a postpetition
period of the year. Under this proposal, for the straddle tax year,
the corporation files just one Form 1120 corporate federal income
tax return at the end of its usual tax reporting year, reflecting all in-
come, expenses, and other tax items for the entire straddle tax year.
A corporate debtor's straddle tax year return need not be filed with
the IRS any earlier, with applicable extensions, than that of a corpo-
rate taxpayer not in bankruptcy. A corporate debtor's straddle tax
year return also does not generally reflect during the straddle tax
See I.RC. §§ 1398 (individuals) and 1399 (corporations).
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (8).
See I.R.C. § 1398.
°' See O'Neill, supra note 94; see also PATCO supra note 94.
I See IRC § 1399.
: Id. IRC § 1398(d) (2).
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year (prepetition or postpetition) any particular items of income or
expense received or accrued by the corporation. Federal income
taxes are incurred and computed on an annual accounting basis.
Section 503(b) (1) (B) (i) classifies as an administrative priority
expense any tax "incurred" by the estate, except a tax of a kind
specified in § 507(a) (8). The legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended straddle tax year income taxes to be considered
"incurred" on the last day of the taxable period of a corporate
debtor for purposes of §§ 503 and 507, the same as under the In-
ternal Revenue Code. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits in O'Neill
and PATCO, however, held that the straddle tax year income tax of
a corporate debtor may also be "a tax of a kind specified in
§ 507(a) (8)," and thereby be excluded from administrative priority
treatment, even though the tax is not "incurred" until after the pe-
tition date.' 4
Because of the way corporate debtors file their Form 1120 re-
turns in a straddle tax year and because of the existence of early
prepetition claim bar dates in bankruptcy cases, the issues raised by
these cases for tax authorities go beyond whether straddle tax year
income tax liabilities will be paid first as administrative expenses
under § 507(a) (1). In most cases, corporate debtors do not even
file their straddle tax year Form 1120 returns within 180 days after
their petition dates (the ordinary prepetition claim bar date for
governmental creditors). When corporate debtors do file their
straddle year Form 1120 returns, there is no requirement that the
returns bifurcate income and expenses for the taxpayer between
prepetition and postpetition periods. Accordingly, if these deci-
sions are not overruled, taxing authorities will be left with the op-
tions of. (1) missing the prepetition claim bar date for the straddle
tax years of every corporation that files bankruptcy; or (2) filing es-
timated protective straddle tax year claims in every corporate bank-
ruptcy case, then burdening the debtor, the courts, and taxing
authorities with later audits, amended pleadings, and other litiga-
tion that might otherwise have been unnecessary.
The third proposal, adopted by the NBRC, permits a corpora-
tion to elect to bifurcate the straddle tax year. If there is a signifi-
cant prepetition filing-year liability, an election to bifurcate the
straddle tax year might provide some breathing room for a finan-
'" O'Neill, 64 F.3d at 1149.
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cially-strapped corporation. The ability to pay the tax over the
six-year period granted for the payment of priority taxes might be a
critical element in proposing a successful reorganization.' s To pre-
vent a trap for the unwary, the due date for the election and the due
date for the return could be the same date as the due date for the
first postpetition return.
C. Subordination of Prepeition Tax Penalties
The Advisory Committee further proposed to subordinate
prepetition tax, penalties in chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases. The pay-
ment of prepetition tax penalties in chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases
should be subordinated to the payment of general unsecured claims
without a requirement of a finding of governmental misconduct. 7
Granting a priority to penalties treats general unsecured creditors
unfairly by punishing them for the debtor's misconduct. This is in-
equitable, especially since the creditors have limited access and abil-
ity to monitor a taxpayer's compliance with tax reporting require-
ments.
The government vigorously opposed the proposal. The prepe-
tition, nonpecuniary loss penalties of all creditors, including tax
authorities, are subordinated to the claims of general unsecured
creditors in a chapter 7 case, pursuant to § 726(a) (4). According to
the government, the Supreme Court has correctly found that out-
side of a chapter 7 liquidation context, prepetition tax penalties
cannot be categorically subordinated to the claims of general unse-
cured creditors."
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1994).
' A similar change to I.R.C. § 1398 might also be advisable. The IRS and Justice De-
partment have expressed concern over whether the United States would be able to make a
claim for the prepetition amount before the claims bar date passed. The bar date for the
prepetition liability incurred in the year of filing could be extended to 180 days after the due
date of the return, including extensions.
- SeeJack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L.
RP.. 153, 196-97 (1995); see also IRC § 1399.
" See United Statesv. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
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IV. CHAPTER 11 IPLAN REQUIREMENTS
The Advisory Committee recommended six changes to the
chapter 11 process. Each of these proposals is discussed below.
A. Amend § 1125(b) to establish standards for tax disclosures in a
chapter 11 disclosure statement
The Advisory Committee recommends that 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b)
be amended to require a discussion of the potential material federal
tax consequences of the plan to the debtor and any entity created
pursuant to the plan, and a discussion of the potential material fed-
eral tax consequences of the plan to a hypothetical investor repre-
sentative of the holders of claims or interests. A failure to discuss
the potential tax consequences of a plan of reorganization in the
disclosure statement can seriously mislead creditor constituencies
and other parties in interest about the plan's economic effects."
There is no justification for allowing a plan proponent to ignore a
plan's tax consequences in the disclosure statement. A plan's tax
consequences represent an important aspect of the plan and should
be fully discussed to the extent they are material. A chapter 11
debtor or other plan proponent who possesses the financial re-
sources to propose a plan of reorganization and draft a disclosure
statement is likely to possess the necessary resources to analyze the
plan's tax effects. A debtor or other plan proponent cannot be ex-
pected to provide each creditor with individually tailored tax infor-
mation; it would be impractical and unreasonably expensive. On
the other hand, addressing the material federal tax matters affecting
a hypothetical creditor or equity security holder in each class cre-
ated under the plan is not burdensome, and a plan proponent fairly
can be required to supply such information in its disclosure state-
ment.
'w See Smith v. Bank of New York, 161 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
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B. Apply the periodic payment provisions of§ 1129(a) (9) (c) to a
secured tax that would be entitled to priority absent their
secured status.
A consensus has been reached by the Advisory Committee that,
as to secured tax claims, without the security would otherwise be
payable as priority, the period over which payments should be made
and the manner of their payment shall be the same as if the claims
were merely priority. This proposal simply codifies the present rule
of law. For all other purposes, the requirements of § 1129(b) (2)
must still be met.
C. Amend § 1141 (d) (3) to except from discharge taxes unpaid by
business -entities, where the nonpayment arose from fraud.
The consensus of the Advisory Committee is to amend §
1141(d) (3) to except from discharge taxes unpaid by a business
debtor where the nonpayment arose from fraud. The Advisory
Committee, however, did not reach a consensus on what conduct
and intent are sufficient to constitute fraud.
D. Require periodic payment for deferred payments of tax under
§ 1129(a) (9) and designate an interest rate to be used while
making those deferred payments.
The Advisory Committee considered a proposal to amend
§ 1129(a) (9) to require periodic payment for deferred tax payments
under § 1129(a) (9), designation of interest rate used while making
those deferred payments, and establishing a six-year period from
the date of the order for relief by which such taxes are to be paid. A
majority of the Advisory Committee concluded that § 1129(a)(9)
should be amended. It was agreed that to prevent unnecessary and
time-consuming litigation, the section should provide that if interest
must be paid on priority taxes, the rate should be determined by §
6621 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, without regard to I.R.C. §
6621 (c), in effect as of the confirmation date."' There is a consen-
sus that because of prejudice to the taxing authorities and the
greater risk of nonpayment, the section should expressly provide for
"' State and local taxing authorities vigoriously challenge this proposal. Many fare
much better under their applicable state interest rate and are not convinced that the right
should be modified in bankruptcy.
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periodic payments (monthly or quarterly), and that balloon pay-
ments be prohibited. It was discussed that the statute be amended
to provide for a fixed period over which payments should be made,
regardless of whether the tax had been "assessed." It was agreed
that the use of the word "assessment" can be confusing and some-
times difficult to apply to the types of taxes asserted by states (such
as sales taxes). Thus, the proposal provides a period of up to six
years from the date of the order for relief, regardless of the age of
the tax owed as the length of time over which payments may be
made.
The proposal was not without its detractors. It was argued that
the proposal weakened the priority status of taxes by giving debtors
an unreasonably long period of time to pay taxes that are past-due
on the petition date. There is much truth to this assertion. Under
the proposal, for example, if trust fund taxes are four years old on
the petition date, debtors would have a total of ten years to repay
the taxes, including six years from the petition date, as compared to
two years under current law. According to the detractor, this result
undermines the historic priority treatment Congress has given taxes
and encourages prepetition delay and abuse of the tax system. Fur-
ther, the proposal allows "stairstep" payment plans, with no increase
in postconfirmation interest rates to reflect the heightened risk
compared to straight-line amortization payments. Moreover, there
is no prohibition on payments to general unsecured creditors in
cash or stock (which can be sold for cash) while so-called "priority"
tax creditors are being stretched out. Ironically, the "priority" and
risk of default as between general unsecured and "priority" creditors
have been reversed. By comparison, general unsecured creditors in
chapters 7, 12, and 13 cases get paid nothing until priority claims
are paid in full.
E. Clarify the effect of a subsequent filing or default on the status
or nature of a tax claim provided for in a chapter 1I plan.
The existing law is unclear with respect to whether a taxing
authority can take administrative collection action when a plan is
dismissed or the debtor defaults on payment of taxes."' The taxing
authorities take the position that tax claims remain collectable as
taxes in the event of a dismissal of a bankruptcy or a default by the
.. See MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, § 13:26.
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debtor as to the terms of payment of taxes under the plan. Some
debtors have argued, however, that the only remedies upon dis-
missal or default are contractual and thus nonpriority, discharge-
able claims. The uncertainty regarding the rights of taxing authori-
ties leads to needless litigation and requires clarification. The rights
of taxing authorities to collect tax debts as taxes rather than as con-
tractual claims, in the event a bankruptcy is dismissed or the debtor
defaults by failing to comply with the terms of payment of taxes un-
der a plan, should be clarified.
However, under the proposal, the taxing authorities may not
begin to collect the tax after default on payment of taxes until the
taxing authority has provided thirty-days' notice of the default to the
taxpayer. The thirty-day notice requirement provides the taxpayer
reasonable notice without unduly burdening the taxing authorities.
A notice provision should permit the debtor/taxpayer an opportu-
nity to cure any default and promote the reorganizational efforts of
the debtor.
F. The Allocation of chapter 11 plan payments to trust fund taxes
and collection remedies available to taxing authorities after
order is entered.
One of the most controversial proposals of the Advisory Com-
mittee addressed several of the issues posed in United States v. En-
ergy Resources, Inc."2 and its progeny to allocate chapter 11 plan
payments to trust fund taxes.
In Energy Resources, the Supreme Court concluded that a
bankruptcy court has the authority to order the IRS to treat tax
payments made by a chapter 11 debtor corporation to reduce trust
fund liabilities where the bankrupcy court determines that the des-
ignation by the plan proponent is necessary for the success of a re-
organization plan.Y"3 The Energy Resources decision is already a
compromise. It gives no right to either the government or the
debtor to make a designation, but allows the bankruptcy court to
approve a designation on a case-by-case basis. To confirm the plan,
the bankruptcy judge must make a finding based on evidence that
the plan is feasible." 4 The taxing authority may be heard on that is-
12 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
"' Id. at 545,549.
. See 11 U.S.C. § I129(a)(11) (1994).
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sue. If the plan is feasible, then the government will ultimately col-
lect the tax.
Allocation of early payments to trust fund taxes may encourage
(or be used as a tool to encourage) insiders to invest further capital
or key employees to continue to work for the debtor. Working off
the trust fund taxes may, thus, increase the likelihood of success of a
reorganization. Allowing the government to hold responsible offi-
cers hostage until the last tax payment is made as a practical matter
makes these people personally liable for taxes as to which they have
no personal responsibility. The result is unfair. The government's
position can be justified only to the extent that the payments can be
said to be "involuntary." Involuntary payments have historically
meant that the payments were made under legal process or compul-
sion. This is not true of payments in a chapter 11.
Government representatives vigorously opposed Energy Re-
sources, arguing that taxing authorities can allocate tax payments
made in the course of a bankruptcy to preserve alternative sources
of collection. This proposal is aimed at chapter 11 plans that pro-
vide for the payment of corporate trust fund taxes first, to protect
the corporation's officers from personal liability to the taxing
authorities. Generally, a corporate debtor owes both trust fund and
nontrust fund taxes when it files a bankruptcy petition. If the cor-
porate debtor's nontrust fund taxes are paid first and the chapter 11
reorganization fails before all outstanding taxes have been paid, the
IRS may collect the unpaid trust fund taxes from the responsible of-
ficers as well as from the corporation. If the trust fund taxes are
paid first and the reorganization fails before the nontrust fund taxes
are paid, the IRS has no alternative means of collecting the out-
standing tax liability. The IRS proposal would prevent corporations
from designating that trust fund taxes be paid first, which would
improperly shift the risk of failure of the reorganization from re-
sponsible officers, whose misconduct caused the tax deficiency and
who are personally liable for the trust fund tax, to the taxing
authorities."'5
"2 Following Energy Resources, the Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court could
authorize the payment of trust fund taxes first in a liquidating chapter 11. This would allow
officers to get personal relief even where the aim of the bankruptcy is not to reorganize the
debtor. See In re Deer Park, Inc., 10 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).
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V. SUBSTANTwE TAX MATrERS
Although the Advisory Committee considered several substan-
tive tax proposals, only two are discussed below. The first proposal
seeks to resurrect a variation of the venerable stock-for-debt excep-
tion to the recognition of cancellation of indebtedness income."6
The second proposal considers the tax consequences of the dis-
charge of nonrecourse and recourse debt.
A. Modification to IRC §§ 108 and 382 with respect to the issuance
of stock for debt.
Under current law, if a corporation is reorganized pursuant to
a chapter 11 plan, that corporation will not include in income any
cancellation of indebtedness (COD) realized as a result of the plan.
The debtor, however, is required to reduce its tax attributes, includ-
ing NOL carryforwards, capital loss and credit carryforwards, and
assets basis in excess of post reorganization liabilities.
Prior to the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993
("OBRA 1993"), the stock-for-debt exception provided an exception
to the requirement that tax attributes be reduced by the amount of
any excluded COD income. Under current law, a corporation that
issues stock to its creditors realizes substantial income from debt
cancellation that must then be applied to reduce tax attributes."7
Thus, companies emerging from bankruptcy may have a tax balance
sheet lower than their financial balance sheet with greater levels of
income for tax purposes and a greater likelihood of liquidation over
reorganization.
Stock-for-debt exchanges are a historical exception to the rec-
ognition of COD income."" Under this exception, if a corporate
" SeegeneallyMCQUEHN &WIuIAMS, supra note 11, chs. 22-23.
." See 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1994).
"' See Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 127 (1st Cir. 1946) (holding
conversion of bonds into stock was not cancellation of indebtedness); Capento Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691, 695 (1942) (recognizing stock-for-debt exchange differs from
discharge of indebtedness and does not result in realization of gain), afi'd, 140 F.2d 382, 385
(1st Cir. 1944) (holding substitution of shares for bonds was recapitalization and not gain);
Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80; Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76 (discussing exchange of stock
and securities in certain reorganizations). 'The cases arrived at this result under the some-
what questionable assertion that there was no satisfaction of the debt, but the issuance of the
stock instead represented the creation of a new liability to substitute for the old." Paul H.
Asofsky, Discharge of Indebtedness Income in Bankruptcy After the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980, 27 ST. Louis U. Lj. 583, 600 (1983). Mr. Asofsky was a member of the Advisory Coin-
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debtor issued stock in exchange for debt, no COD income arose
even when the stock was worth less than the debt satisfied."9 The
theory that led to the implementation of this exception was that the
substitution of stock-for-debt continued a creditor's interest in the
corporate debtor.'"°
Prior to the enactment of the stock-for-debt exception in
§ 108(e) (8), the House bill provided partial nonrecognition treat-
ment for debtors who issued stock to creditors in satisfaction of
debts other than securities. 2' The debtor was required to recognize
as income any excess of the amount of the debt over the fair market
value of the stock issued.' When a debtor transferred stock for se-
curities, however, the House bill would have provided for a full non-
recognition treatmentL2 The logic behind this disparate treatment
of exchanges of securities, as opposed to other debts, is not readily
apparent. A possible explanation may be that a creditor holding a
security would not be entitled to recognize a loss, whereas a holder
of nonsecurity instruments would possibly be entitled to a bad debt
deduction. The House bill sought to treat debtors and creditors
symmetrically by requiring a debtor to recognize income only when
the creditor would be able to take a deduction for the bad debt in
the same situation.
24
The Senate Finance Committee questioned the House's pro-
posed version of the stock-for-debt exception and amended the bill
which eventually became law to continue the prior case law rules
governing stock-for-debt exchanges, except for de minimis cases."
In the words of Senator Russell Long, "by providing for favorable
tax treatment if stock is issued to creditors in discharge of debt, the
[Senate Finance] committee bill will encourage reorganization,
mittee.
" See Motor Mart, 156 F.2d at 127 (finding such a transaction "a form of payment for
the bonds" rather than cancellation of indebtedness).
"i Mark A. Frankel, Federal Taxation of Corporate Reorganizations, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
55,63 (1992).
"' For a discussion of the legislative history of the enactment of the stock-for-debt excep-
tion in the Board of Tax Appeals, see Asofsky, supra note 118, at 602-04.
' H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 14 (Mar. 19, 1980).
' See id.at 13.
" SeeAsofsky, supra note 118, at 602-04,613-14.
The stock-for-debt exception was codified at I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) (1988) (amended
1993). For a discussion of de minimis cases, see McQueen & Williams, supra note 11.
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rather than liquidation, of financially distressed companies that
have a potential for surviving as operating concerns.126
Thus, as enacted, the general rule was that no reduction of tax
attributes or basis in depreciable property is required when a cor-
poration issues stock, either voting or nonvoting, common or pre-
ferred, to discharge a debt.' The only time the stock for debt ex-
ception would not apply was in de minimis cases, which
encompassed two situations: (1) where only a nominal or token
amount of stock is issued;' 28 or (2) where, in the case of an unse-
cured creditor, the ratio of the stock received, measured by value, to
the debt canceled or exchanged for such stock was less than half the
ratio of stock-to-debt computed for all unsecured creditors partici-
pating in the workout." In cases where the exchange ratio was less
than fifty percent of the ratio for all unsecured creditors, the debtor
corporation would realize income to the extent the debt forgiven
exceeds the value of the stock given in exchange for the debt.s In
1984, changes to the Internal Revenue Code narrowed the excep-
tion to include only tile 11 debtors, or insolvent debtors to the ex-
tent of their insolvency.'
OBRA 1993 repealed the stock-for-debt exception to COD in-
come.'32 The controversial repeal is effective for stock transferred
after 1994, except for stock transferred in a title 11 or similar case
that is filed before the end of 1993.' ''
There are persuasive arguments both for and against the stock-
for-debt exception. Those opposing the exception have asserted
that the exception incorrectly measures income, is a source of need-
"" 126 CONG. REc. 25,33913 (1980) (statement of Sen. Long).
'" "It is obvious that there would be no necessity for a statutory restriction on the 'stock
for debt exception' unless one such exception existed." Asofsky, supra note 118, at 604.
See I.R.C. § 108(e) (8) (A) (1988) (repealed 1993).
See I.R.C. § 108(e) (S) (B) (1988) (repealed 1993).
Although the statute did not specifically define the terms "unsecured creditor" and
"workout," the Senate Report added that a claim is considered secured by a property lien to
the extent of the property's fair market value. See S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 17 n.19 (Nov. 25,
1980). Any excess over fair market value is considered a separate claim of an unsecured
creditor. See id. A "workout" was described as a title 11 case, transaction, or set of transac-
tions resulting in a significant restructuring of a financially unstable corporation's debt. See
id. at 17 n.20. Thus, it is possible that receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceedings in
federal or state courts would be considered workouts.
' See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59,98 Stat. 494,576 (1984).
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226(a), 107
Stat. 312,487-88 (1993).
,"' See id. § 13226(a) (3).
302 [Vol. 14
NBRC Tax Recommendations
less transactional complexity, unduly influences the structuring of
transactions, promotes trafficking in loss corporations, and repre-
sents bad tax policy.'" To be sure, difficult issues concerning the ex-
ception remained at the time of its repeal. Nonetheless, the IRS
had issued guidelines throwing some light on these issues.'" To
doom the exception because of its influence on the structure of
transactions or its complexity is unconvincing. Tax law is increas-
ingly complex largely because business and commerce are increas-
ingly complex.
Opponents of the exception, however, correctly point out that
the exception is inconsistent with the horizontal equity principle."
An often stated goal of tax policy is the equal treatment of similar
taxpayers with similar incomes. The stock-for-debt exception vio-
lates the horizontal equity principle because it allows insolvent and
title 11 taxpayers to preserve their tax attributes while preventing
solvent taxpayers from doing the same.3 7 This certainly may be true.
Nonetheless, although the policy of horizontal equity is important,
it is not the only consideration. In fact, section 108 already violates
the horizontal equity principle by permitting attribute reduction
under § 108(b) by solvent title 11 debtors while denying similar
benefits for solvent taxpayers not in bankruptcy. The Board of Tax
Appeals, through § 108, provides this beneficial treatment to title 11
debtors in furtherance of the fresh start policy, which obviously
trumps the horizontal equity policy in some circumstances.
Ken Kies opposes the stock for debt exception as an
"anachronism remaining from a time when the theoretical ground-
ings of the income tax system were less sophisticated."" He then
dismisses the foundation for the exception-that the investor has
changed the nature of its investment in the taxpayer from that of
debt to equity-as lacking "any relationship with economic real-
ity."' " This author finds this statement quite puzzling. In bank-
ruptcy, the absolute priority rule essentially treats creditors of a
debtor as the "owners" of the firm."" Moreover, the debtor owes a
' See Kenneth J. Kies, Repeal the Stock-for-Debt Exception, AM. BANKIu INST. J. 18
(July/Aug. 1993).
' See Rev. Proc. 94-26, 1994-1 C.B. 612.
I See, e.g., Kies, supra note 134, at 41.
13 See id.
- See id. at 42.
1- Id.
" See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, Baraining After the Fall and the Con-
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fiduciary duty to its creditors in bankruptcy similar to the duty owed
to its equity holders outside of bankruptcy.14 With an insolvent or
title 11 debtor, the essence of "economic reality" is that the credi-
tors own the firm.'
Supporters of the stock-for-debt exception urge numerousjusti-
fications for their position. First, the exception treats equity more
favorably than debt at the precise time when more equity and less
debt are important and beneficial to insolvent and title 11 debt-
ors.'4 Second, the exception encourages rehabilitation of businesses
by allowing businesses in a precarious financial position to shield
future income by the retention of tax attributes.'" Third, repeal of
the exception is inconsistent with I.RC. § 382 () (5) and (6), which
provides special relief for businesses in bankruptcy as to the use of
NOLs and carryovers.' 45 Fourth, the transactions covered by the ex-
ception are essentially capital transactions in which creditors receive
new instruments in exchange for their "ownership" interest.' Al-
though opponents of the stock for debt exception make some im-
portant criticisms, many of these criticisms may be accommodated
by minor modifications to the exception. On balance, proponents
for the exception have the better argument. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the recent empirical work by Professors Newton and
Wertheim.
47
tours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738,742 (1988) ("[Tihe absolute prior-
ity role simply restates the idea of a layered ownership structure in which one owner has bar-
gained for the right to be paid before others.").
141 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1985);
Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963) ("[S]o long as the Debtor remains in posses-
sion, it is clear that the corporation bears essentially the same fiduciary obligation to the
creditors as does the trustee for the Debtor out of possession.").
" Accord Wayne 1. Danson &Sharon P. Lyle, Stock-for-Debt Exception is Essential, Am.
BANKR. INST.J. 18 (1993).
" See AMERICAN INSrlITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBuIC AccOUNTANTS, PRFSS RELEASE, STOCK-
FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION TO CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME 2 (July 20, 1993)
[hereinafter AICPA RELEASE].
" See Danson &Lyle, supra note 142, at 18.
" See AICPA RELFASE, supra note 143, at 2.
' See Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184 (1942) ("When
[in bankruptcy] the equity owners are excluded and the old creditors become the stockhold-
ers of the new corporation, it conforms to realities to date their equity ownership from the
time when they invoked the processes of law to enforce their rights of full priority."). See also
AICpA RELFASF, supa note 193, at 2.
" See generally Grant Newton & Paul Wertheim, Examining the Impact From the Re-
peal of the Stock-For-Debt Exception, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 355 (1995).
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In a valuable empirical study conducted by Newton and
Wertheim, it was convincingly shown that the limited amount of
revenue generated by the repeal will be offset by other revenue
losses because of business liquidations and a concomitant increase
in unemployment." The professors concluded that the majority of
the 622 million dollars estimated as increased revenue from the re-
peal of the exception must ultimately come from smaller, non-
public corporations -- ironically the very corporations that are
least able to afford the loss of the benefit." The professors contend
that the repeal of the exception especially does not bode well for
small businesses in California and the West Coast, where economic
recovery has lagged behind other parts of the country. 5'
The statistical results and inferences drawn by the professors
are deserving of greater attention and should be welcomed by those
interested in this debate. More data is needed to evaluate the effi-
ciency of this and other exceptions to COD income. Until that time,
policy makers are not acting with the best information available.
It is proposed that I.R.C. § 108 be amended to provide that a
corporation undergoing a reorganization in bankruptcy be permit-
ted to make a fresh start election when undergoing bankruptcy re-
organization. The election is identical to the proposed election of
the ABA Tax Section Task Force on the Tax Recommendations of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.'52
B. Modification of JRC § 1001 to provide for parallel tax treatment
of recourse and nonrecourse debt.
The NBRC has adopted the Advisory Committee's recommen-
dation that Congress modify I.R.C. § 1001 to provide that tax con-
sequences of the transfer of an asset to satisfy a nonrecourse debt
(for example, foreclosure or transfer in lieu of foreclosure) should
be the same as a transfer to satisfy a recourse debt.
Presently, what drives the controversy in this area of bankruptcy
taxation is the disparate treatment by the Internal Revenue Code
" Id. at 729-32.
Id at 730-32.
Id at 730-31.
... Id. at 732.
"' Tax Recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. ABA Tax
Section Task Force (April 15, 1997) at 202-07 [hereinafter "ABA Task Force"].
19981 305
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL
between COD income under I.R.C. § 108 and gain realized upon
foreclosure under I.R.C. § 1001(c). Under I.R.C. § 108, COD in-
come that would otherwise be included in gross income under
I.R.C. § 61 (a) is excluded to the extent the taxpayer is insolvent or
the discharge occurs pursuant to a court order in bankruptcy.'
However, the Internal Revenue Code extracts a price for the I.R.C.
§ 108 exclusion-certain enumerated tax attributes must be re-
duced by the directives of§ 108(b). If there are no tax attributes or
the attributes have been used up, any remaining COD income
evaporates in bankruptcy, and the taxpayer is no longer liable for
the tax associated with the income. This is an important tax break
for bankrupt or insolvent taxpayers not provided for other taxpay-
ers.
This tax favoritism does not exist for amounts realized under
I.R.C. § 1001 (c) upon a sale or exchange such as a foreclosure sale.
The I.R.C. § 108 exclusion applies only to COD income; the exclu-
sion does not apply to reduce tax liability associated with gains real-
ized from high-debt low-basis property." What exacerbates the
situation, however, is the way nonrecourse debt is treated upon
foreclosure." If the secured debt is recourse, the IRS has main-
tained the position that the full tax consequences take two steps to
ascertain."
First, the amount of cancellation of indebtedness income is
equal to the difference between the fair market value of the prop-
erty and the amount of the recourse debt.57 This amount may be
excluded in bankruptcy under I.R.C. § 108. Second, the amount
realized for I.R.C. § 1001(c) purposes is equal to the difference be-
tween the asset's fair market value and its adjusted basis."" This
I.R.C. § 1001(c) amount is not governed by the more generous
rules of exclusion in I.R.C. § 108. This two-step method asserted by
the IRS often leads the parties in informal workouts, or pursuant to
agreed orders terminating the automatic stay in bankruptcy, to
SeeI.R.C.§ 108(a) (1994).
,uSee id. § 108(a).
'' For a detailed treatment of the tax consequences of foreclosure, see Alice Cunning-
ham, Payment of Debt with Property-The Two Step Analysis After Commissioner v. Tufts,
38 TAX LAW. 575,599-605 (1985); Richard C. Onsager &John R. Becker, The Federal Income
Tax Consequences of Foreclosures and Repossessions, 18J. REAL EST. TAX'N 291 (1991).
See generally Onsager & Becker, supra note 155, at 293.
SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.1001- 2(c); Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B.12.
&' See id.
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agree to a value for the underlying asset on the extreme low end of
the range of fair market values to minimize gain and to maximize
cancellation of indebtedness income.
If the secured debt is nonrecourse, the Supreme Court man-
dates significantly different treatment. If the secured debt is nonre-
course, the amount realized for I.RC. § 1001 (c) purposes is equal
to the difference between the face amount of the debt and the ad-
justed basis in the asset.'59 The fair market value of the property is
irrelevant to the calculation. This creates greater hardship when
the assets in question have substantially declined in value as was ex-
perienced in the real estate markets in the Southwest. Further-
more, no cancellation of indebtedness income is generated by the
satisfaction of nonrecourse debt by foreclosure. Thus, a taxpayer
cannot use I.R.C. § 108 to alleviate any tax associated with the fore-
closure sale and ultimate discharge of nonrecourse debt. This pe-
culiar result has led some taxpayers to attempt to convert nonre-
course debt for which they are not personally liable to recourse debt
for which they are personally liable in an attempt to use I.R.C. § 108
to minimize taxes owed from the contemplated foreclosure."6
An example may illuminate the disparate treatment of nonre-
course debt viz a viz recourse debt. Let us assume that a debtor, we
shall call him Tinker, owns an office building subject to nonre-
course indebtedness of $1 million. The fair market value of the
property is $500,000, and the adjusted basis is $250,000. If the
lender forecloses upon the property in full satisfaction of the debt,
the amount realized under § 1001 (c) is $750,000, the difference be-
tween the amount of nonrecourse debt and the adjusted basis. In
other words, Tinker is treated as though he sold the property for
the face amount of the debt. None of this § 1001(c) gain may be
excluded under I.R.C. § 108. Section 108 is reserved for cancella-
tion of indebtedness income.
Let us assume that Chance operates a similar building on a
property adjacent to Tinker's. In fact, Chance used the same lender
and granted a lien in the property securing $1 million of indebted-
ness. Chance is personally liable for the debt; that is, the debt is re-
" See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1001-2. See also On-
sager & Becker, supra note 155, at 292.
" Of course, to the extent the conversion from nonrecourse to recourse is part of a tax
avoidance scheme, I.R.C. § 269 will prevent its intended effects. Furthermore, the IRS may
characterize the conversion as an "exchange" under I.R.C. § 1001(c).
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course as to Chance. The fair market value of the property and the
adjusted basis are exactly the same as in Tinker's example-
$500,000 and $250,000, respectively. If the lender foreclosures on
the property in full satisfaction of the recourse debt, Chance's tax
consequences are vastly different than Tinker's. Using the two-step
analysis asserted by the IRS, Chance recognizes cancellation of in-
debtedness income of $500,000, the difference between the amount
of indebtedness and the fair market value of the property. The en-
tire amount may be excluded from income pursuant to I.R.C. § 108.
Chance also recognizes income under I.R.C. § 1001 (c) of $250,000,
the difference between the property's fair market value and its ad-
justed basis. Thus, on the same facts, Chance recognizes $500,000
less as income than Tinker solely because the former's debt was re-
course, and the latter's debt was nonrecourse.
The ABA Task Force proposal provides that the difference be-
tween the basis of the property and the fair market value of the
property would be a gain or loss on transfer and the difference be-
tween the fair market value and the amount of the nonrecourse
debt would be income from the cancellation of debt under I.RC.
§ 61. The tax treatment of income from cancellation of debt would
be governed by I.R.C. § 108. This treatment is consistent with the
tax consequence of the transfer of property to satisfy recourse debt.
This change would overrule Commissioner v. Tufts,'6' and gen-
erally follow the position taken by Professor Wayne G. Barnett as
amicus curiae in the Tufts case.'62 The change would eliminate the
problems that arise when recourse debt is converted to nonrecourse
debt over which the taxpayer has no control, such as when the trus-
tee abandons property to the debtor. For example, the IRS has
ruled that abandonment of property was not a taxable event to the
estate but held that the recourse debt became nonrecourse as a re-
sult of the discharge.'"
Taxpayers that plan to transfer property to satisfy a nonre-
course debt often work out an agreement with the creditor to for-
give all or part of the debt in excess of the value of the property.
This agreement is made as a separate transaction, prior to transfer-
ring the property, to avoid all of the gain being taxed as a gain on
transfer. (Of course, if the taxpayer has capital loss carryovers, this
"' 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
See id. at n. 11 (discussing Professor Barnett's amicus brief).
Priv. Ltr. Ru. 89-18-016 (Jan. 31, 1989).
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agreement would be unnecessary.) This proposed change to § 1001
would eliminate action of this nature, eliminate the problems asso-
ciated with attempting to determine if debt is recourse or nonre-
course, and eliminate attempts to convert nonrecourse debt to re-
course or vice versa.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the preparation of the first installment,'" Congress has
sought to consider and potentially enact many of the proposals put
forth by the Advisory Committee and adopted by the NBRC. Thus,
the bold efforts on the part of the NBRC in seeking advice and con-
fronting the tax issues may lead to several positive changes to a dif-
ficult but important body of law.
'" See Jack F. Williams, National Bankruptcy Resiew Commission Tax Recommenda-
tions: Inditidual Debtors, Priorities, and Discharge,14 BANKR DEV.J. 1(1998).
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